Professor Martin Ashley
I retired from full-time academic work in 2013 and have finally, after thirteen years of hanging on, decided that it’s no longer appropriate to maintain the website of a working academic. I have long been an advocate of open access but without an institution to fund the article processing charge, the peer review which remains the gold standard for publication has become an expensive business. I do still enjoy writing, so I have decided that the occasional “essay” is probably the best way to keep my interest in philosophy active and I hope some of these will be of interest to those who discover them.
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Although my research outputs may appear somewhat eclectic, polymath even, you will find a coherent narrative derived from my 1998 thesis on value as a reason for action. My principal concern is with environmental sustainability and my contention is that it will never be achieved unless the environment and natural world are valued more highly. I realise now that I left the most fundamental question unanswered, and it’s a big philosophical one. Are intrinsic values real?
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Predictions made in 1998 that were based on detailed analysis of the values of the “Millennium Children” (those born during the 1980s and at school during the 90s) have come to pass. The climate has warmed significantly and it is now looking probable that the Millennium Children and their descendants will witness irreversible tipping points. Why?
Value as a reason for action has motivated and sustained an approach to education in the Steiner Waldorf schools markedly different from that driven by the values of mainstream schooling. The work we were privileged to undertake in the Steiner schools has been the most widely read of all my publications - which can be seen as a measure of value in itself.
Values that define identity. Important as issues of gender and masculinity are, then, it is important that we do not allow ourselves to be side-tracked by a single focus on gender and thus become blind to other issues of identity which may be as important or more important.